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Karol Wojtyła’s personalism, 
though original and novel, is asso-
ciated with, and even rooted in, sev-
eral modern philosophical projects. 
In this way the Polish philosopher 
conducted a kind of intellectual con-
versation with various thinkers of 
the past and constructed his own philosophical stance. However, it does 
not mean that Wojtyła uncritically accepted the philosophical vocabulary 
used by previous thinkers. Indeed he had his own personal message to 
convey, worded in his own specific language. This is why he used various 
concepts and terms coined by great figures in the history of philosophy 
but attempted to work out a new perspective and, at times, a whole new 
meaning for some of them. In his philosophical language there are some 
notions, which underwent a kind of serious sematic shift. The concept 
of suppositum is one of these.
The meaning of suppositum is close to the meaning of subject but 
it has a clearly metaphysical character. Thus when we refer this notion 
to the human being we are going to claim that the human being is the 
subject of its own existence and actions, and as such can be investigated 
within a theory of being. Wojtyła was aware that a human person cannot 
be adequately explained within the sole concept of suppositum but, at the 
same time, he hoped that this notion brings with it an important mes-
sage concerning the nature of personhood. Although the term is a part 
of ancient and medieval heritage, it plays a vital role in contemporary 
thinking of the human person. Having said that, we must point to one 
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important circumstance: the employment of the concept of suppositum 
carried out by Wojtyła was not a literal transmission of the pre-modern 
way of philosophizing into contemporary philosophy. Keeping its original 
significance, the notion is perceived through the prism of modern and 
contemporary knowledge about the person. And this circumstance allows 
us to claim that suppositum is remade and enriched by Wojtyła’s attempts.
In this paper, I would like, first, to sketch Wojtyła’s approach to meta-
physics. Second, I would like to penetrate the meaning of the term and 
its place in the philosophy of the human person advanced by the Polish 
thinker. Finally, I will be trying to look critically at Wojtyła’s endeavor 
and ask how its understanding and content can be strengthened by an 
original concept of substance worked out by W. Norris Clarke. Both Karol 
Wojtyła and Norris Clarke were adherents of Thomistic philosophy, al-
though in various degrees. Clarke is more metaphysically-oriented so he 
can bring some help to Wojtyła whose writings seldom directly address 
metaphysical themes. The general aim of the paper is not only to sketch 
Wojtyła’s thinking about suppositum but also to contribute some insight 
into the metaphysics of the person.
Wojtyła and metaphysics 
When we look at ideas set out by John Paul II concerning a need for 
metaphysics, we have no doubt that he appreciated the role of a first phi-
losophy in a broader culture, and specifically in the philosophy of the 
human person. In his encyclical letter Fides et ratio, the “later Wojtyła” 
underlines without hesitation “the need for a philosophy of genuinely 
metaphysical range, capable, that is, of transcending empirical data in or-
der to attain something absolute, ultimate and foundational in its search 
for truth.”1 Such a first philosophy is not opposed to a genuine reflec-
tion on the human being but can be helpful and complementary. As he 
claims, “metaphysics should not be seen as an alternative to anthropol-
ogy, since it is metaphysics which makes it possible to ground the concept 
1 John Paul II, Fides et ratio, no. 83. 
99 Karol Wojtyła on the metaphysics of the person
of personal dignity in virtue of their spiritual nature. In a special way, 
the person constitutes a privileged locus for the encounter with being, 
and hence with metaphysical enquiry.”2 In the light of these clear decla-
rations, Wojtyła can be perceived as a strong metaphysician, or at least 
someone who decisively favors a metaphysical approach in philosophy as 
such. But what about the “earlier Wojtyła”? Was he equally determined 
to promote this kind of philosophizing, and, if so, how successful was 
he in this respect?
As a young student of theology Karol Wojtyła was impressed by Thom-
istic philosophy, and especially by Thomistic metaphysics. Talking about 
it later in his life, he acknowledged that studies in first philosophy had 
helped him to acquire “a new vision of the world” and led him to a dis-
covery, which “has remained the basis of intellectual structure in his life.”3 
This discovery underpinning his intellectual endeavors appeared from 
time to time in Wojtyła’s early works. His first scholarly achievement 
was concerned with the question of faith in the thought of St. John of 
the Cross. Metaphysics was indirectly present here because contact with 
God and an endeavor to understand it presupposes the question of be-
ing. Later Wojtyła turned to moral theology. In his work on Max Scheler 
and the suitability of his ethics for Catholic moral theology, the Polish 
thinker made reference to metaphysical issues, for instance when he cri-
tiqued Scheler’s failure to recognize the “substance” of the person.4 When 
he crossed the threshold into philosophical ethics, Wojtyła quite often 
undertook metaphysical analyses in order to shed some light on the cat-
egories needed in ethical investigation. Thus we notice that he gave some 
scholarly attention to concepts like nature5 and the good.6 Or when talk-
ing about the sexual drive, he pointed to metaphysics as the final ground 
2 Ibid. 
3 A. Frossard, “Be not afraid”: pope John Paul II speaks out on his life, his beliefs, and his 
inspiring vision for humanity, trans. J. R. Foster, New York 1984, p. 18.
4 K. Wojtyła, Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniu syste-
mu Maxa Schelera, [in:] id., Zagadnienie podmiotu moralności, Lublin 1991, p. 120. 
5 For and example of this see: id., Elementarz etyczny, Lublin 1999, p. 33ff. 
6 For and example of this see: id., Wykłady lubelskie, Lublin 1985, p. 141–144. 
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to the proper understanding of it.7 Generally, he was convinced that the 
philosophy of consciousness must be supplemented by the philosophy 
of being. He voiced this when he talked about a realistically understood 
consciousness connected with the person’s being which is a condition of 
not making this being into an autonomous, enclosed in itself, subject of 
activity.8 But through this entire period, although conscious of the im-
portance of first philosophy, Wojtyła did not develop a systematic project 
of metaphysics in general, nor the metaphysics of the human person in 
particular. 
Some scholars claim that Karol Wojtyła never attempted to formulate 
his own concept of metaphysics of the person.9 This is probably true but 
only to a point. On the one hand, the Polish philosopher did not write 
a paper, let alone a book, which was entirely dedicated to the philosophy 
of being. This suggests that he was basically involved in other ways of 
philosophizing. His analyses on the person are basically conducted along 
a phenomenological path, and the issue of being is here presupposed but 
not adequately explained. This raised some criticism at the very begin-
ning, when his main work The acting person10 was published for the first 
time.11 But on the other hand, he was convinced of the need and even 
7 In his Love and responsibility he states the following, “but if the sexual urge has an exis-
tential character, if it is bound up with the very existence of the human person – that first and most 
basic good – then it must be subject to the principles which are binding in respect of the person.” 
See K. Wojtyła, Love and responsibility, trans. H. T. Willetts, San Francisco 1981, p. 52. (Polish orig-
inal is: Miłość i odpowiedzialność, Lublin 1960). 
8 K. Wojtyła, In search of the basis of perfectionism in ethics, [in:] id., Person and commu-
nity. Selected essays, trans. T. Sandok, New York 1993, p. 54. 
9 See e.g. A. J. Reimers, Karol Wojtyła’s aims and methodology, delivered at the confer-
ence Christianity Confronts Modernity, December 12–14, 2013, University of Notre Dame (USA), 
publication pending. 
10 The acting person is the English edition of Osoba i czyn, which is cited in the following 
notes.
11 Polish philosopher of Thomistic orientation Krąpiec commenting on the book de-
nied that Wojtyła had managed to formulate an adequate philosophical anthropology. He pointed 
to a lack of analyses of human activities in essential contexts of human life. Krąpiec called Wojtyła’s 
enterprise “an aspect anthropology”, “anthropology for the use of ethicist and moralist”, “ethical an-
thropology”. See M. A. Krąpiec, Książka kardynała Karola Wojtyły monografią osoby jako podmiotu 
moralności, “Analecta Cracoviensia” 5–6 (1973–1974), p. 57–58. 
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the necessity of metaphysics in the philosophy of the human person. In 
this paper we will be trying to demonstrate and analyze some passages 
where attempts at carrying out this need and necessity are undertaken. 
Preliminary we can ask about Karol Wojtyła’s sources of metaphysical 
formation. We are interested in these circumstances, specifically as far as 
the concept of suppositum is concerned. There is no doubt that our phi-
losopher was educated in Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy, domi-
nant at that time in his environment. As the later Wojtyła mentioned to 
André Frossard, he had studied metaphysics from a book by Kazimierz 
Wais, a Thomistic philosopher in pre-war Poland. Let us treat this po-
sition as a prime source of the metaphysical knowledge entertained by 
Wojtyła in his later activities. In this book on ontology and metaphysics 
we find some basic concepts, including notions referring to the human 
being. As was the custom of traditional Thomistic philosophers, Wais 
distinguishes the concept of the individual (individuum) from the notion 
of the person – individual with reason. The latter is also called supposi-
tum rationale, but a sole suppositum is equivalent to the term individua 
substantia (also appearing in the Boethian definition of the person). Un-
derstandably the notion of suppositum is broader than suppositum ratio-
nale because – as Wais observes – “any person is an individual but not 
every individual is a person.”12 In the anthropological analyses of Wojtyła, 
there is a sole concept of suppositum without a qualifier rationale. It is 
thus because the philosopher is basically concerned with human subjects 
and has no doubt as to their rational powers and faculties. Nevertheless, 
the person is for him merely a starting point and we can underline two 
reasons explaining this attitude. First, Wojtyła tries to demonstrate the 
insufficiency of the metaphysical approach to the human individual, that 
is, to prove that without experience we cannot achieve the complete pic-
ture of the person. Second, the suppositum itself is a richer reality than 
classical scholastic analyses reveals. In this paper, we will be basically 
concerned with the latter.
12 K. Wais, Ontologja czyli metafizyka ogólna, Lwów 1926, p. 140. 
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Personhood and suppositum
In this part of our analyses, we will be following Wojtyła’s expressions 
concerning the concept of suppositum as far as the structure of person-
hood is concerned. First, we will focus on negative expressions, namely 
expressions by which our philosopher proves an insufficiency in the no-
tion for an adequate understanding of the person. Second, we will try to 
sketch a positive role of suppositum in the constitution of the person. In 
this part, we will also point to the further development of the concept 
as set out by Wojtyła in his later works, namely papers published after 
The acting person. 
To be a person is something more than to be a suppositum. Such is 
the first and foremost part of Wojtyła’s philosophical account of the hu-
man being. The suppositum is a subject of existence and action and this 
thesis stems from a long philosophical tradition to which our philoso-
pher subscribes. But this kind of subjectivity points only to an objective 
meaning of the subject, and all spheres of subjective experience are put 
aside. The Polish philosopher expresses this view quite openly, saying that, 
“the notion of suppositum passes over an aspect of consciousness due to 
which a particular human being – a subject being an object – experiences 
himself as a subject. Thus he experiences his subjectivity and this experi-
ence provides him with a ground to term himself with a pronoun ‘I’.”13 In 
other words, the latter is not a reality separate from the suppositum but 
encompasses it as its own part. The integrally understood “I” besides an 
ontic subjectivity (the suppositum), consists of the experienced subjectiv-
ity.14 In short, the complete subjectivity of the person goes well beyond 
the suppositum alone.
13 K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn, [in:] id., „Osoba i czyn” oraz inne studia antropologiczne, Lu-
blin 1994, p. 93. Later, Wojtyła specifies that the term “experience” includes semantically “conscious-
ness”. He claims, “if this being, that is a real individual object in its basic ontic structure, is equivalent 
to a reality which in traditional philosophy was called the suppositum, then without consciousness 
this suppositum cannot be constituted as ‘I’.” Ibid., p. 95. 
14 Ibid., p. 93. 
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The meaning of ontic subjectivity is close to the concept of individual 
substance or individuated nature, which constitues part of the Boethian 
definition of the person. Another important feature of this substance is 
that it has a rational nature. These theses about the person – as Wojtyła 
claims – are necessary but insufficient.15 The person possesses in herself 
a kind of fullness, which cannot be adequately explicated by metaphysical 
terms alone. They merely introduce into the reality of the person and as 
such are important but they provide too general a framework, which is 
basically insufficient for the depth and complexity of the person.
Nevertheless, the suppositum can be perceived from a positive and con-
structive side. Having in mind all previous remarks on its insufficiency, 
we can also emphasize the important role it plays in the constitution of 
the person. This role, as we mentioned above, is quite complex. Wojtyła 
is aware of it and unfolds its role gradually. 
The Polish philosopher points initially to a way in which it is given 
epistemologically to a subject. He claims that the human being has a kind 
of basic experience allowing her to establish that she is the subject of ex-
istence and action. This kind of experience has a very fundamental and 
holistic character. Wojtyła expresses this conviction this way, “any human 
being, including myself, is given in a whole that is a simple experience 
as the individual real being, as the subject of existence and action (that 
is as the suppositum.)”16 Thus we can argue that the suppositum is not so 
much inferred from other concepts but has experiential foundations. Of 
course, a subsequent proper understanding of the notion engages our 
rational powers and faculties, and its mature comprehension is the fruit 
of our sophisticated analyses. 
Suppositum cannot be understood as an abstract ground upon which 
personal characteristics are inserted. It does have its vital participation 
in a personal constitution of any human individual. Even if we can as-
cribe an analogous suppositum to other non-human entities, the human 
suppositum is a suppositum of ‘who’ but not of ‘what’. As our philosopher 
15 Ibid., p. 123. 
16 Ibid., p. 94. 
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emphatically underlines, “the person is the suppositum but very differ-
ent from others surrounding the human being in a perceptible world. 
This otherness, this proportion or rather disproportion indicated by pro-
nouns “who” and “what”, permeates into the very root of being who is 
the subject”17. Wojtyła is convinced that, in a family of entities, there are 
wide varieties and even when we claim that many beings can be charac-
terized in terms of suppositum, at the same time, we must employ analo-
gous thinking. 
A factor, which introduces the vital difference between the human 
suppositum and others, is the way of existing (esse). It has a clear person-
al mark and goes beyond a “marker” of the existence of an individuated 
nature. The human suppositum reveals and manifests a kind of fullness 
typical for the person in all his uniqueness and unrepeatability. Wojtyła, 
taking into account our cognitive abilities, claims that, “the person al-
lows to identify himself as the suppositum when an adequate analogy is 
employed. The suppositum of ‘who’ reveals not only similarity but also 
a difference and distance from any suppositum of ‘what.’”18
The personal suppositum reveals its specific character when we take 
into account personal dynamism. On the level of various dynamisms, 
we obtain a clear picture of the unique profile of the person’s metaphysi-
cal subjectivity. Thus the latter is the ground of both “happenings” and 
“personal acts.” A complex potentiality initiating two fundamental ac-
tivities in the suppositum of the person is present: first, what takes place 
despite someone’s rationality and freedom, and second, efficacy/operativ-
ity, which stems from a free and rationally informed self-determination.19 
What is important here is to point to a kind of coherence of these two 
dynamisms, despite their differences concerning personal and intentional 
involvement. Wojtyła would tend to characterize this binding supposi-
tum as a common source for the whole person. For him, it is a principle 
of unity and non-contradiction. Our philosopher puts it this way, “on 
17 Ibid., p. 123. 
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., p. 124. 
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the ground of suppositum difference and opposition between someone’s 
acts and happenings […] yield because of the obvious unity and identity 
of the human being. It is he who acts. And when something happens in 
him, he – a personal ‘somebody’ – does not act, but nevertheless all dy-
namism of happenings is equally his property as well as the dynamism 
of acts. He – a personal ‘somebody’ – remains at the beginning of the 
happenings taking place in him as well as at the beginning of acts which 
he carries out as a perpetrator.”20 
In further developments of the meaning of this concept, Wojtyła clear-
ly stresses both a continuation of the ancient and medieval heritage, and 
a modern and contemporary contribution to the understanding of sup-
positum. The former factor already seems to be obvious for us. The latter 
demands some comments and analyses. Many philosophers drawing on 
concepts that originated in ancient and medieval philosophy do this in the 
context of projects developed by modern and contemporary philosophy. 
This seems to be the case of the Polish thinker. He considers the notion 
of suppositum taking into account essential Kantian distinctions. This is 
especially evident when Wojtyła undertakes a new attempt to describe 
and define this ancient notion. He asserts: “this concept serves to express 
the subjectivity of the human being in the metaphysical sense. By ‘meta-
physical’, I mean not so much ‘beyond-the-phenomenal’ as ‘through-the-
-phenomenal’, or ‘trans-phenomenal’.”21 The suppositum is not like a Kan-
tian thing-in-itself (noumenon) unknown and beyond our experience. It 
is indeed something that is given through phenomena, in a sense, present 
in phenomena. That is why facing various human phenomena, we also 
have a chance to perceive and grasp the suppositum. Wojtyła underlines 
this important moment saying, “through all the phenomena that in ex-
perience go to make up the whole human being as someone who exists 
and acts, we perceive – somehow we must perceive – the subject of that 
20 Ibid., p. 128.
21 K. Wojtyła, The person: subject and community, [in:] id., Person and community, op. 
cit., p. 222.
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existence and activity. Or better, we perceive that the human being is – 
must be – that ‘subject’.”22 
The metaphysical subject, constituting the foundation of the human 
being and “manifesting” itself through her various activities, plays a vital 
role in the identity of the person. Talking about identity we mean a kind 
of basic sameness of the human individual. In contemporary philosophy, 
especially of the English-speaking provenience, very complex discussions 
on this topic are conducted. Wojtyła does not delve into them but offers 
his own proposal. In doing this he does not hesitate to point that, “meta-
physical subjectivity, or the suppositum, as transphenomenal and there-
fore the fundamental expression of the experience of the human being, 
is also the guarantor of the identity of this human being in existence and 
activity.”23 Thus the suppositum guarantees the sameness of the person in 
two dimensions: in her coming to be and in her enduring through time 
as well as in her various activities, including acts and happenings. Gener-
ally comparing this proposal to ideas of some modern and contemporary 
thinkers, we must observe that the identity of the person is guaranteed 
here by a primary dimension of the human being but not by a secondary 
one(s). The latter would be the case when consciousness, memory and 
further personal characteristics came into play as main factors.
The suppositum as an expression of metaphysical subjectivity is not 
detached from a personal subjectivity. Wojtyła tries to sketch what kind 
of relation is between them. Assuming that the human person is an in-
tegrated entity, these two instances of subjectivity must be connected 
with each other in an essential way. The Polish philosopher observes 
that the self constitutes itself through actions, including strictly person-
al acts and other psychosomatic dynamisms that simply happen in her. 
But this development of the self is possible “because it already is and has 
been constituted in an essential and fundamental way as a suppositum.”24 
The personal subjectivity then depends, to a considerable extent, on the 
22 Ibid., p. 222–223. 
23 Ibid., p. 223. 
24 Ibid., p. 225.
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metaphysical subjectivity. The instances of the former do not come from 
the void but stem, in a sense, from a well “established source.” From the 
other side, this relation is made clear when Wojtyła declares, “the sup-
positum humanum must manifest itself as a human self: metaphysical 
subjectivity must manifest itself as personal subjectivity.”25 
This essential relation leads to some important consequences. As the 
Polish philosopher points out, “the human being is a person ‘by nature’. 
The subjectivity proper to a person also belongs to the human being 
‘by nature’.”26 The suppositum tends “naturally” to become the person in 
a strict sense, and vice versa – the personal subjectivity is firmly anchored 
in the human subjectivity. This thesis, of course, can be at times problem-
atic. There are known examples of people who do not reach a threshold of 
personal life due to various diseases or health abnormalities. They do not 
display typical personal characteristics, for example self-consciousness 
and the faculty of verbal communication. Then can we wonder wheth-
er the relation between these two instances of subjectivity is indeed so 
stringent and necessary. Wojtyła himself deals with this inquiry claiming 
that a factual manifestation of the relation is not so important. Person-
al characteristics – as he claims – “reside within the essentially human 
suppositum.”27 This residence should be understood metaphysically and 
not empirically. To make it clear, we can employ a distinction between 
potentiality and ability. The latter is concerned with a current readiness 
of the human being to manifest personal characteristics due to the proper 
development of certain vital organs, for example the brain and nervous 
system. Potentiality in turn points to a very fundamental orientation to 
produce such characteristics, which can be subscribed to the human 
being as such despite her level of development and maturity. Thus we 
can conclude that Wojtyła draws a relation between the metaphysical 
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid. In other places he points out that typically personal features like in-selfness and 
inwardness of human activity and existence are part of the definition of “what is contained virtual-
ly in the notion of suppositum humanum.” See ibid., p. 227.
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subjectivity and the personal one on the level of potentiality not ability, 
and hence on the level of metaphysics and not phenomenological insight.
Critical look at the project and its further developments 
Wojtyła’s approach to the concept of suppositum is not systematic. 
There is no separate treatise of his on the issue. In order to reconstruct 
the philosopher’s thinking in this respect, it is necessary to refer to vari-
ous places in his writings. As we have seen above, remarks and analyses 
on the issue are scattered and fragmentary. Nevertheless, the notion itself 
plays quite an important role in Wojtyła’s understanding of the person. 
In fact, it would be difficult to speak about the metaphysics of the per-
son without a notion like this. Consequently, suppositum is necessary to 
comprehend adequately personal subjectivity as well as the integral pic-
ture of the person and her acts. 
Nevertheless, the notion of metaphysical subjectivity demands some 
further clarifications in order to serve its purpose. Introducing this con-
cept, Wojtyła intended to provide a firm foundation for the project of 
the person. This project in turn was to be a theoretical framework for 
a reality which is rich in its various phenomena, including rational and 
free undertakings as well as non-intentional happenings. In short, the 
person – in his thought – is a highly dynamic reality. If this is the case, 
then we need to point to its adequate foundation. There are two reasons 
that speak to this necessity. First, for Wojtyła, to be a person is not to be 
an emergent reality, as it is understood in contemporary non-reductive 
naturalism. It means that the person cannot be treated as a reality that 
arises out of some basic constituents, but is richer and more complex in 
its being and at the same time irreducible to them. Second, for Wojtyła 
the foundation of the person is somehow present in further activities: 
as we mentioned above, the suppositum is transphenomenal. Hence, if 
phenomena in themselves are rich and diverse so must be their founda-
tion. That is why we need to sketch the understating of the metaphysical 
subject as a highly dynamic reality, which has a vital relation with the 
whole activity of the person. In order to do that, we need an adequate and 
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a well-defined concept of substance. Wojtyła himself does not provide us 
with this type of theory because – as we mentioned at the beginning – he 
was not a fully-fledged metaphysician. We should turn in another direc-
tion for this vital support. 
In this respect, an interesting contribution is made by the American 
philosopher W. Norris Clarke. It seems that his original interpretation of 
Thomas Aquinas’s thought can bring some help to our investigation of 
the person. Wojtyła and Clarke were contemporaries, and both received 
inspiration from Thomas Aquinas and the Thomistic philosophical tradi-
tion but in different ways. Wojtyła was an ethicist and a thinker involved 
in the philosophy of the human person. Clarke was a metaphysician en-
tertaining a vivid interest in the reality of the human person. Both were 
also open to non-Thomistic philosophical ideas, especially modern and 
contemporary ones. Clarke openly makes references to Wojtyła’s ideas 
concerning the person and finds them interesting, novel, and worth of 
pursuing.28 Although Wojtyła did not make explicit reference to Clarke’s 
works, we can employ ideas of the American philosopher and in this way 
ponder whether we can complement and strengthen the anthropological 
project of the Polish thinker. At any rate, Clarke has something impor-
tant to offer to Wojtyła, especially as far as the metaphysical foundations 
of the person are concerned.
In the Acting person, Wojtyła acknowledges that the metaphysical 
subject is a dynamic reality. He indicates directly that, “the suppositum is 
not only inserted (‘lays’) under a whole dynamism of the human being – 
the person – but also constitutes this dynamism as a dynamic source.”29 
As we have set forth above, the Polish philosopher indicates that this 
type of character of the metaphysical subject significantly influences the 
personal subject and her acts. The problem is that we do not know any 
28 W. N. Clarke, Person and being, Milwaukee 1993. He also makes other references to 
the thoughts of the Polish thinker. See W. N. Clarke, John Paul II: the complementarity of faith and 
philosophy in the search for truth, “Communio” 26 (1999), p. 557–570; id., The integration of person-
alism and Thomistic metaphysics in twenty-first-century Thomism, [in:] id., The creative retrieval of 
St. Thomas Aquinas. Essays in Thomistic philosophy, new and old, New York 2009, p. 226–231.
29 K. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn, op. cit., p. 124. 
110 Grzegorz Hołub
other details as to how this happens. We need to determine the dynamic 
character of the suppositum itself and its relation to the personal subject.
Norris Clarke, in his reading of Aquinas, points out that the me-
dieval philosopher understood each living entity as a dynamic and self-
manifesting being. In this understanding, there is no place for a passive 
existence enclosed in itself, limited to its inner sphere and to a mysteri-
ous, unknowable enduring. If this were so, “there would be no way for 
anything else to know that it exists; it would make no difference at all 
to the rest of reality; practically speaking, it might just as well not be at 
all – it would in fact be indistinguishable from non-being.”30 Clarke un-
derlines the close and essential relation between existence and action. 
As he puts it, “to be and to be active, though conceptually distinct, are 
inseparable.”31 The activity here is comprehended very broadly, including 
very basic manifestations of existing things, but taking place at all levels 
of its existence. The American philosopher is even convinced that “the 
full meaning of ‘to be’ is not ‘to be present’, but ‘to be actively present’.”32 
At any rate, existence is a dynamic process and hence we have no better 
means to grasp and characterize it as by a description of a set of actions, 
which make it up. 
Such an understanding of the existence enables us to formulate a con-
cept of substance. Both Wojtyła and Clarke recognize a helping role of 
the concept in the philosophy of the human person, which is not a typi-
cal attitude in contemporary philosophy. As it is widely known, there is 
great skepticism among thinkers as to the suitability of the notion in an 
inquiry on the human being. Nevertheless, the substance is understood 
here not as a passive and inert reality – which is a common objection 
directed to it – but as a highly dynamic one. Clarke straightforwardly 
declares that, “to be in the world of real existence is to be substance-in-
relation.”33 The dynamic character of the existent is instantiated by various 
30 W. N. Clarke, Person and being, op. cit., p. 12–13.
31 Ibid., p. 13. 
32 Ibid. 
33 W. N. Clarke, To be is to be substance-in-relation, [in:] id., Explorations in metaphysics. 
Being. God. Person, Notre Dame 1994, p. 114.
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relations, which a given being establishes. These relations are directed to 
itself as well as to others, because – as Clarke puts it – “it exists both as 
in-itself and as toward others.”34 
In the tradition of Thomistic metaphysics this way of philosophizing 
can be problematic. There is a clear distinction here between the meaning 
and roles of substance and relation. While talking about the existence of 
a thing, a language of substance plays an essential role, whereas it is not 
so in the case of relation language. Generally, relation is considered as 
accidental to a given thing. This logic applies to persons as well. Thomas 
Aquinas, while pondering about God as a person, points out that “the 
word person is the idea of a ‘first’ substance. Therefore this word person 
signifies a ‘first’ substance, than which nothing is more absolute, since 
it is self-existent. Therefore the word person does not signify a relation, 
but something absolute. […] If then person signifies substance which is 
a self-existent being, it cannot signify a relation.”35Although according 
to Aquinas, in God relations are absolute (“in God relation is really the 
same as the essence”), the distinction between the person-substance and 
a relation applies to all human persons. Therefore, Clarke’s claim “to be 
is to be substance in relation” must be specified. In order to do that, we 
should distinguish between various relations, say, external and internal. 
External relations, which seem to be on Thomas Aquinas’s mind, are 
indeed secondary. It is not so with internal relations, namely relations 
which are constitutive for the person-substance itself.
Now we can return to Wojtyła’s concept of suppositum. The ques-
tion is whether we can apply Clarke’s analysis to the understanding of 
a metaphysical subject and if so, how helpful is it? The Polish philoso-
pher directly introduces a distinction between the metaphysical subject 
and a personal one. Clarke does not operate such a distinction limiting 
his undertaking to the discrimination between nature and the person. 
Nevertheless, it does not amount to a major obstacle. We can argue that 
if the understanding of the substance as a dynamic entity is referred to 
34 Ibid., p. 108. 
35 Thomas Aquinas, On the power of God (Questiones Disputatae de Potentia), Q. IX, A. IV.
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the person, it is referred to the whole being, including her metaphysical 
and personal subjectivity, and the level of the nature as well as the level 
of the person. In other words, both the former and the latter are in rela-
tion, though in different ways.
Let us focus on the notion of the human substance, which can be 
characterized by dual subjectivity. If the metaphysical and personal sub-
jects, considered together, constitute a highly dynamic reality it means 
that it establishes a set of “inner” as well as “outer”relations. In this sense 
it would live up to Clarke’s postulate of existing in-itself and toward oth-
ers. The inner relations then would have intra-being characters and are 
established when the human being comes to be, and is developing and 
maturing according to her proper telos. These relations exist between 
the metaphysical and personal subject. Although the former tends to 
constitute the latter (to express itself in the latter), and what is ontologi-
cally given is “taken over” by the personal, there still remains a slight 
difference and contrast between them. Many personalists point out that 
the term “substance” contains in itself something cosmological (appear-
ing in various forms) which is not totally congruent with the personal 
(understood as a complex sphere).36 In Wojtyła’s analyses this duality is 
underlined when he considers the cosmological, which is reducible, and 
the personal, which is irreducible. The Polish thinker is aware that the 
personal does not “absorb” the cosmological completely, but they “need” 
one another, and hence they remain mutually in relation.37 Thus there is 
36 See J. F. Crosby, The selfhood of the human person, Washington, D.C, 1996 (Polish trans-
lation: Zarys filozofii osoby. Bycie sobą, trans. B. Majczyna, Kraków 2007); M. J. Burgos, El persona-
lismo. Autores y temas de una filosofía nueva, Madrid 2003, ch. V (Polish translation: Personalizm. 
Autorzy i tematy nowej filozofii, trans. K. Koprowski, Warszawa 2010). 
37 This theme is widely analyzed by Wojtyła in his influential paper Subjectivity and the 
irreducible in the human being, [in:] K. Wojtyła, Person and community, op. cit., p. 209–217. Sugge-
stions appear there that allow us to talk about these inner relations, when the philosopher points to 
an insufficiency of the metaphysical definition of the person. He reasons as follows, “[…] the Bo-
ethian definition mainly marked out the ‘metaphysical terrain’ – the dimension of being – in which 
personal human subjectivity is realized, creating, in a sense, a condition for ‘building upon’ this ter-
rain on the basis of experience” (ibid., p. 212). Or in another place where Wojtyła points out that 
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not a complete fusion between suppositum and the personal subject and 
that is why they remain related within the human substance.
The outer relations are toward other subjects. They provide the person 
with opportunities to actualize and manifest herself in all her personal 
richness and complexity. They create a sphere of “social between” where 
the person can unfold her many potentialities. But these relations are 
accidental and secondary in the logical (absolute) order, that is, as far as 
the structure of the person is concerned. In this sense Aquinas was right 
excluding relation from a strict definition of the person. Outer interac-
tions cannot constitute the personal being but they are helpful in her 
manifestation in the social sphere. However, when we look from the lat-
ter standpoint, we can claim that this is a sphere where we get to know 
the person in the first place. Hence, in the phenomenal (epistemologi-
cal) order – which was important for Wojtyła – outer relations can be 
considered primary and necessary.38 
Conclusions
The concept of suppositum has a long philosophical pedigree, especial-
ly in Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy. Karol Wojtyła accepted that 
as a part of the philosophical environment within which he was educated. 
Nevertheless, he was not uncritical. On the one hand, the Polish philoso-
pher was aware of the positive and constructive role the concept can play 
in the exploration of the human person. On the other, Wojtyła intended 
to bring out all possible implications connected with the concept of the 
metaphysical subject and, at the same time, was cautious and avoided 
some metaphysical “extremities.” Thus, for example, the suppositum is not 
like the Cartesian self-enclosed and self-sufficient substance. Neither is 
it the Lockean inert, unknowable substratum. Wojtyła’s thinking of the 
what is personal is complementary to what is cosmological suggesting an inner relationality in the 
person. Ibid., p. 213. 
38 W. N. Clarke, Action as self-revelation of being. A central theme in in the thought of 
St. Thomas, [in:] id., Explorations in metaphysics, op. cit., p. 47.
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suppositum is also far from the notion of a bundle of personal character-
istics. The latter easily leads to a thesis that the personal subject can exist 
without the metaphysical one. Understandably such a solution would be 
unacceptable for him. 
The Polish philosopher tries to reconcile two essential attributes con-
cerning the person, namely that she is both a substantial and dynamic re-
ality. He did not explained in detail how they fit together, but drawing on 
the ideas of Norris Clarke, we can solve this nexus pointing to a notion of 
relation. Here, the inner relations, necessary and essential, are especially 
helpful. They shed some light on the association of the suppositum with 
the personal subject. They amount to intra-being connections, which are 
fundamental for the person and without which there is no possibility of 
inter-being or inter-personal relations. 
Summing up we can argue that the concept of the dynamic metaphysi-
cal subject, in an advanced form, can be vital in supporting the philosophy 
of the human person. Considered together with the personal subject, it 
uncovers two pillars in the mature understanding of the human being: 
substantiality and relationality. Substantiality, due to its inner relational-
ity, makes the human being a highly dynamic reality. 
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